عنوان مقاله [English]
Under cumulativeness of contractual sanctions, if such sanctions integrate with each other to compensate for the damages incurred by obligee, legal provisions shall allow them to be executed simultaneously. However, according to the specific performance, obligor is bound to execute the obligation and the initial cumulativeness of termination of contracts and compensation is not possible. Therefore, there is a relationship between the primacy of specific performance and initial cumulativeness of sanctions (termination of contract and compensation) so, by applying one of them, the other one will not be exercised, whereas the mentioned legal institutions have special efficiency and from the viewpoint of the economic analysis of law, legislators should provide for compatibility between them. Thus, in this article the interaction of primacy of specific performance to contract termination with the cumulative contractual sanctions is examined with benefiting from the economic analysis of law including the efficiency, cost-benefit, welfare, game theory. Also the solution regarding the constructive relationship between the mentioned legal institutions from the economic point of view will be proposed to legislator.
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