نقش لیسانس فرند فناوری در تسهیل فرایند تعیین استانداردهای فنی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حقوق تجارت بین‌الملل و حقوق مالکیت فکری دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 کارشناس ارشد حقوق مالکیت فکری دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

سازمان‌های تعیین استاندارد در زمینة حقوق مالکانة اشخاص راهبردهایی مبتنی بر حقوق مالکیت فکری تدوین کرده‌اند که یکی از آن‌ها تعهد به اعطای لیسانس منصفانه و معقول و غیرتبعیض‌آمیز (فرند) است. این التزام در پیشبرد مزایای استانداردسازی ـ از جمله تعامل‌پذیری، توسعة نوآوری، ارتقای رقابت، و افزایش رفاه مصرف‌کنندگان ـ بسیار کارساز است. هدف نویسندگان مقالة حاضر این است که ضمن بررسی اهمیت استانداردهای فنی و نقش محوری سازمان‌های تعیین استاندارد در ایجاد و توسعة آن‌ها جایگاه لیسانس فرند را در تعیین و تجاری‌سازی فناوری‌های ضروری استاندارد تحلیل کنند. این نوشتار نشان می‌دهد چالش میان روند گزینش یک استاندارد و حقوق انحصاری ناشی از فناوری جدّی است و در این میان حصول توافق میان سازمان‌های تعیین استاندارد و دارندة فناوری برای اعطای مجوز بهره‌برداری خاص به کاربران استاندارد فنی اهمیتی حیاتی دارد. ابعاد چنین موضوعی در حقوق ایران ناشناخته است و مقررات ویژه‌ای در این زمینه وجود ندارد و تمهید لیسانس اجباری نیز قادر به برآورد انتظارات و مطالبات مختلف این عرصه نیست. اما، تعمق در راهکارها و واکاوی رویه‌های موجود حقوقی می‌‌تواند در پیوند میان فناوری‌های مزبور و فرایند تعیین استاندارد راهگشا باشد و بستر حقوقی لازم را برای توسعة استانداردهای فنی مرتبط با دارایی‌های فکری مهیا سازد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Role of FRAND License in Facilitating Technical Standards-setting Process

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ebrahim Rahbari 1
  • Fatemeh Yazdandust 2
1 Assistant Professor of International Trade & Intellectual Property Law Department, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
2 M. A in Intellectual Property Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Facing proprietary rights of individuals, standard-setting organizations have developed strategies based on intellectual property rights. One of the most important strategies is the commitment to grant Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licenses. This commitment plays an important role in advancing the benefits of standardization, including interoperability, development of innovation, promotion of competition and enhancement of consumer welfare. The present study is going to demonstrate the importance of technical standards and the role of standard setting organizations in their creation and development and analyze the key role of FRAND license in determination and commercialization of standard essential patents. This paper shows that there is serious challenge between the process of choosing a standard and the exclusive rights arising from a technology, therefore, it is crucial that standard setting organizations and technology holder reach an agreement to grant specific licenses to implementers of technical standards. The aspects of the subject are not known in Iranian law and there are no special provisions in this regard. The compulsory license is not an appropriate device to reply various expectations and demands in this field, but considering and analyzing of the existing approaches and legal procedures can be beneficial and constructive to link these patents up with the standard setting process and development of technical standards related to intellectual properties.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Technical Standard
  • Patent Rights
  • FRAND License
  • Essential Patent for Standard
  • Intellectual Property Rights
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